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4.1 Introduction
The inflation of the past decade and a half has dispelled the notion that
default-free nominal bonds are a riskless investment. Conventional wis-
dom used to be that the conservative investor invested principally in
bonds and the aggressive or speculative investor invested principally in
stocks. Short-term bills were considered to be only a temporary "parking
place" for funds awaiting investment in either bonds or stocks. Today
many academics and practitioners in the field of finance have come to the
view that for an investor who is concerned about his real rate of return,
long-term nominal bonds are a risky investment even when held to
maturity.
The alternative view that a policy of rolling-over short-term bills might
be a sound long-term investment strategy for the conservative investor
has recently gained credibility. The rationale behind this view is the
observation that for the past few decades, bills have yielded the least
variable real rate of return of all the major investment instruments traded
in U.S. financial markets. Stated a bit differently, the nominal rate of
return on bills has tended to mirror changes in the rate of inflation so that
their real rate of return has remained relatively stable as compared to
stocks or longer-term fixed-interest bonds.
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This is not a coincidence, of course. All market-determined interest
rates contain an "inflation premium," which reflects expectations about
the declining purchasing power of the money borrowed over the life of
the loan. As the rate of inflation has increased in recent years, so too has
the inflation premium built into interest rates. While long-term as well as
short-term interest rates contain such a premium, conventional long-term
bonds lock the investor into the current interest rate for the life of the
bond. Jf long-term interest rates on new bonds subsequently rise as a
result of unexpected inflation, the funds already locked in can be released
only by selling the bonds on the secondary market at a price well below
their face value. But if an investor buys only short-term bonds with an
average maturity of about 30 days, then the interest rate he earns will lag
behind changes in the inflation rate by at most one month. For the
investor who is concerned about his real rate of return, bills may there-
fore be less risky than bonds, even in the long run.
The main purpose of this paper is to explore both theoretically and
empirically the role of nominal bonds of various maturities in investor
portfolios. How important is it for the investor to diversify his bond
holdings fully across the range of bond maturities? We provide a way to
measure the importance of diversification, and this enables us to deter-
mine the value of holding stocks and a variety of bonds, for example, as
opposed to following a less cumbersome investment strategy, such as
concentrating in stocks and bills alone.
One of our principal goals is to determine whether an investor who is
constrained to limit his investment in bonds to a single portfolio of
money-fixed debt instruments will suffer a serious welfare loss. In part,
our interest in this question stems from the observation that many em-
ployer-sponsored tax-deferred savings plans limit a participant's invest-
ment choices to two types, a common stock fund and a money-fixed bond
fund of a particular maturity.
1
A second goal is to study the desirability of introducing a market for
indexed bonds (i.e., an asset offering a riskless real rate of return). There
is a substantial literature on this subject,
2 but to our knowkedge no one
has attempted to measure the magnitude of the welfare gain to an
individual investor from the introduction of trading in such securities in
the U.S. capital market.
In the first part of the paper we develop a mean-variance model for
measuring the value to an investor of a particular set of investment
instruments as a function of his degree of risk aversion, rate of time
preference, and investment time horizon. We then take monthly data on
real rates of return on stocks, bills, and U.S. government bonds of eight
different durations, their covariance structure, and combine these esti-
mates with reasonable assumptions about net asset supplies and aggre-
gate risk aversion in order to derive a set of equilibrium risk premia. This169 Inflation and the Role of Bonds
procedure allows us to circumvent the formidable problems of deriving
reliable estimates of these risk premia from the historical means, which
are negative during many subperiods. We then employ these parameter
values in our model of optimal consumption and portfolio selection in
order to address the two empirical issues of principal concern to us. The
paper concludes with a section summarizing the main results and pointing
out possible implications for private and public policy.
4.2 Theoretical Model
4.2.1 Model Structure and Assumptions
Our basic model of portfolio selection is that of Markowitz (1952) as
extended by Merton (1969, 1971). Merton has shown that when asset
prices follow a geometric Brownian motion in continuous time and
portfolios can be continuously revised, then as in the original Markowitz
model, only the means, variances, and covariances of the joint distribu-
tion of returns need to be considered in the portfolio selection process.
In more formal terms, we assume that the real return dynamics on all n
assets are described by stochastic differential equations of the form:
where Rt is the mean real rate of return per unit time on asset i and of is
the variance per unit of time. For notational convenience we will let R
represent the n-vector of means and fl the n x n covariance matrix,
whose diagonal elements are the variances cr? and whose off-diagonal
elements are the covariances a,-,.
Investors are assumed to have homogeneous expectations about the
values of these parameters. Furthermore, we assume that all n assets are
continuously and costlessly traded and that there are no taxes.
3
The change in the individual's real wealth in any instant is given by
(1) dW = wiw^dt - Cdt + WtWiVidzt,
where W is real wealth, C is the rate of consumption, and wt is the
proportion of his real wealth invested in asset i.







where E is the expectation operator, p is the rate of time preference,
U(Ct) is the utility from consumption at time t, and H is the end of the
investor's planning horizon.170 Zvi Bodie/Alex Kane/Robert McDonald
The individual's derived utility of wealth function is defined as




J is interpreted as the discounted expected value of lifetime utility,
conditional on the investor's following the rules for optimal consumption
and portfolio behavior. This value can be computed as a function of
current wealth. The specific utility function with which we have chosen to
work is the well-known constant relative risk aversion form,
U(Q = —, for 7 < 1 and 7 * 0:
log C, for 7 = 0,
with 8 = 1 — 7 representing Pratt's measure of relative risk aversion. This
functional form has several desirable properties for our purposes. First,
the investor's degree of relative risk aversion is independent of his
wealth, which in turn implies that the optimal portfolio proportions are
also independent of wealth. Second, actually solving the problem in (2)
allows us to find an explicit solution for the derived utility of wealth






and v is a number which reflects the parameters of the investor's invest-
ment opportunity set and his degree of risk aversion.
4 Specifically, when




where A = i'n'^, B = R'£l~
xR, G = i'd'H, D = BG- A
2 where Us a
vector of dimension n all of whose elements are one.
The degree of relative risk aversion plays an important role in the
specific numerical results which follow, so we interpret this parameter by
means of a simple example. Suppose an individual faces a situation in
which there is a .5 probability of losing a proportion x of his current
wealth and a .5 probability of gaining the same proportion. What propor-
tion of current wealth would the individual be willing to pay as an
insurance premium in order to eliminate this risk?
5
Table 4.1 displays the value of this insurance premium for various
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which involves a gain or loss of 10% of current wealth an investor with a
coefficient of relative risk aversion of one would only pay V2 of 1% of his
wealth (or 5% of the magnitude of the possible loss) to insure against it,
while an investor with a 8 of 10 would pay 4.42% of his wealth (which is
fully 44.2% of the magnitude of the possible loss). If the investor with a 8
of 10 faces a risky prospect involving a possible gain or loss of 50% of his
wealth, he would be willing to pay 92% of the possible loss to avoid the
risk.
4.2.2 Optimal Portfolio Proportions and Equilibrium Risk Premia
The vector of optimal portfolio weights derived from the optimization
model described above is given by
(6) w* = -n
G / G
Note that these weights are independent of the investor's rate of time
preference and his investment horizon. Merton (1972) has shown that
AIG is the mean rate of return on the minimum variance portfolio and
that (£l~H)IG is the vector of portfolio weights of the n assets in the
minimum variance portfolio. Denoting these by Rmin and wmin, respec-
tively, we can rewrite equation (6) as
The demand for any individual asset can thus be decomposed into two
parts represented by the two terms on the right-hand side of equation (7):
(7) wf = - 2 Vy(Rj - /?min) + w;,min ,
o i= i
where v/; is the ijth element ofCl"
1, the inverse of the covariance matrix.
The first of these two parts is a "speculative demand" for asset /, which
depends inversely on the investor's degree of risk aversion and directly on
a weighted sum of the risk premia on the n assets. The second component
is a "hedging demand" for asset i which is that asset's weight in the
minimum-variance portfolio.
6
Under our assumption of homogeneous expectations the equilibrium
risk premia on the n assets are found by aggregating the individual
demands for each asset (eq. [6']) and setting them equal to the supplies.
The resulting equilibrium yield relationships can be expressed in vector
form as
(8) R-Rmini
where 8 is a harmonic mean of the individual investors' measures of risk173 Inflation and the Role of Bonds
aversion weighted by their shares of total wealth, wM is the vector of net
supplies of the n assets each expressed as a proportion of the total value of
all assets, and o-min is the variance of the minimum variance portfolio.
The portfolio whose weights are given by wM has come to be known in
the literature on asset pricing as the "market" portfolio, and we will
adopt that same terminology here. Equation (8) implies that
(9) Ri-Rmin = S(ViM-vlan), i = 1, . . . , W ,
where viM is the covariance between the real rate of return on asset / and
the rate of return on the market portfolio.
This relationship holds for any individual asset and for any portfolio of
assets. Thus for the market portfolio we get
(10) flM-flmin = 8(<TM-<Tmin)-
It is interesting to compare this with the traditional form of the capital
asset pricing model which assumes the existence of a riskless asset. In that
special case Rmin is simply the riskless rate and o^in i
s zero.
By substituting the equilibrium values of R( - Rmin from equation (8)
into equation (6'), we get for investor k
(11)
 wk=—wM + \l-—\ wmin.
This implies that in equilibrium every investor will hold some combina-
tion of the market and the minimum variance portfolios. If the investor is
more risk averse than the average he will divide his portfolio into positive
positions in both the market portfolio and the minimum variance port-
folio, with a higher proportion in the latter the greater his degree of risk
aversion. If he is less risk averse than the average he will sell the minimum
variance portfolio short in order to invest more than 100% of his funds in
the market portfolio.
4.2.3 The Welfare Loss from Incomplete Diversification
Suppose the investor faces an investment opportunity set consisting of
less than the full set of n assets. How much additional current wealth
would he have to be given in order to make him as well off as he was with
the full set of n assets?
Let J(W | n) be the lifetime utility of an investor who chooses from
among n assets, and let J(W | n - m) be the lifetime utility of an investor
choosing from among a restricted set of assets. Let W represent the
investor's actual level of current wealth and W the level at which his
welfare would be the same under the restricted opportunity set. W is
defined by J(W | n) = J(W\n - m).174 Zvi Bodie/Alex Kane/Robert McDonald
Thus W — W is the extra wealth necessary to compensate the investor
for having a restricted opportunity set and is greater than or equal to zero.
From equation (4) we get
(12) W=W. (9-
P-Y-)]
where v is calculated according to equation (5) and corresponds to the
restricted opportunity set.
7
Equation (12) implies that the magnitude of the welfare loss will in
general depend on the investor's risk aversion, 8, rate of time preference,
p, and investment horizon, H. Since Wis proportional to W, a convenient
measure of this loss is W/W — 1, the loss per dollar of current wealth,
which is independent of the investor's wealth level. Since W s= W, this
number is always greater than or equal to zero.
Of course, certain restrictions on the investment opportunity set need
not decrease investor welfare. We know from equation (11) that even if
the investor had only two mutual funds to choose from, there would be no
loss in welfare, provided they were the market portfolio and the mini-
mum variance portfolio. Merton (1972) has shown that any two portfolios
along the mean-variance portfolio frontier would serve as well. But, in
general, restricting the number of assets in the opportunity set does lead
to a loss in investor welfare.
4.2.4 The Shadow Riskless Rate and the Gain
from Introducing a Riskless Asset
We define the shadow riskless real rate of interest as that rate at which
an investor would have no change in welfare if his opportunity set were
expanded to include a riskless asset. When the investment opportunity
set includes a riskless asset, Merton (1971) shows that the lifetime utility
of wealth function is the same as (4), except that v is replaced by \, where
v_* ^(R-RFiySl-^R-RFi) (13)
28
We find the expression for the shadow riskless rate by setting v equal to
\ and solving for RF. This gives
(14) Rf^Rmin-^iin-
This implies that a risk-averse investor will always have a shadow riskless
real rate which is less than the mean real return on the minimum variance
portfolio. The return differential is equal to his degree of relative risk
aversion times the variance of the minimum variance portfolio.175 Inflation and the Role of Bonds
If there is a zero net supply of this riskless asset in the economy, the
equilibrium value of RF will just be .Rmin — 5ff^,in. Therefore, by assump- tion, an investor with average risk aversion will not gain from the intro-
duction of a market for index bonds. For an investor whose risk aversion
is different from the average there will be a welfare gain, ignoring the
costs of establishing and operating such a market. We measure this gain
analogously to the way we measured the welfare cost of incomplete
diversification in the previous section.
As before, let Wbe the investor's actual level of wealth and Wthe level
at which his welfare would be the same under an opportunity set ex-
panded to include a riskless asset offering a real rate of Rmin - 80-^in-
Since in this case W < W, we take as our measure of the welfare gain from
indexation 1 — (W/W), or the amount the investor would be willing to
give up per dollar of current wealth for the opportunity to trade index
bonds.
4.3 The Data and Parameter Estimates
In this section we will describe our data and how we used them to
estimate the parameters needed to evaluate the welfare loss from restrict-
ing an investor's opportunity set and the gain from introducing a real
riskless asset. It must be borne in mind that we were not trying to test the
model of capital market equilibrium presented in section 4.2 empirically
but rather to derive its implications for the specific questions being
addressed in this paper. It was therefore important to maintain consist-
ency between the underlying theoretical model and the parameter esti-
mates derived from the historical data, even if that meant ignoring some
of the descriptive statistics yielded by those data.
Our raw data were monthly real rates of return on stocks, one-month
U.S. government Treasury bills, and eight different U.S. bond portfolios.
We used monthly data in order to best approximate the continuous
trading assumption of Merton's model, and because one month is the
shortest interval for which information about the rate of inflation is
available. The measure of the price level that we used in computing real
rates of return was the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Consumer Price Index,
excluding the cost-of-shelter component. We excluded the cost-of-shelter
component because it gives rise to well-known distortions in the mea-
sured rate of inflation.
The bill data are from Ibbotson and Sinquefield (1982), while the bond
data are from the U.S. Government Bond File of the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago. The stock data
are from the CRSP monthly NYSE file. We divided the bonds into eight
different portfolios based on duration. We felt that duration was superior176 Zvi Bodie/Alex Kane/Robert McDonald
to maturity as a criterion for grouping the bonds since it takes into
account a bond's coupon as well as its maturity.
8 The durations of the
bond portfolios range from 1 to 8 years.
Table 4.2 presents the means, variances, and correlation coefficients of
the monthly real rates of return on the 10 asset categories for three
subperiods between January 1953 and December 1981. The first is the 12
years from January 1953 to December 1964, a period of relative price
stability; the second is the 8 years from 1965 to 1972, a period of moderate
inflation; and the third is the 9 years from 1973 to 1981, a period of
relatively rapid inflation.
The measure of the real rate of return used in all cases was the natural
logarithm of the monthly real wealth relatives Qi(t)/Qi(t - 1). On the
assumption that these returns follow a geometric Brownian motion in
continuous time, dQt\ Qt = Rtdt + <Jidzh the log of the wealth relative over a discrete time interval is normally distributed with mean |x, and
variance of, where |x, = R{ - (of/2). The means reported in table 2 were
converted to annual rates by multiplying them by 12 and the standard
deviations by multiplying them by Vl2- This makes them comparable to
the means and standard deviations one would obtain using a 1-year
holding period.
A most striking aspect of these descriptive statistics can be seen in part
C of the table: all assets have negative mean returns over the last sub-
period. This presents a dilemma for anyone requiring estimates of the
risk premia called for in models of capital market equilibrium, since their
recent historical pattern is grossly inconsistent with the pattern implied by
the variance-covariance matrix estimated from the same data.
As Merton (1980) has shown, in order to get a reliable estimate of the
mean of a continuous-time stochastic process, it is necessary to observe
the process over a long span of time. Variances and covariances, how-
ever, can be measured fairly accurately over much shorter observation
periods. We therefore chose to ignore the historical means reported in
table 4.2, while using the estimated covariance matrix.
The standard deviations of all 10 assets reported in table 4.2 increased
significantly over the 3 periods. Since we were interested in computing
welfare losses and gains for investors in today's U.S. capital markets, we
used in our calculations the variance and correlation coefficients esti-
mated for the most recent period, 1973-81.
The standard deviations for this last subperiod fall into a clear pattern.
The lowest is for bills, .0126, which is well below that on 1-year bonds, the
next lowest reported in the table. The standard deviation on bonds rises
continuously with duration, reaching a maximum of .1095 on duration 8.
Stocks have a standard deviation of .1735, which is 1.6 times that of
duration 8 bonds and about 14 times that of bills. In the previous two
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81 subperiod, they fall into approximately the same pattern of relative
magnitudes.
Turning to the matrix of correlation coefficients, we see that in the last
subperiod all of the correlations are positive. Stocks had correlations
ranging from .20 (with bills) to .33 (with duration 8 bonds), and they do
not rise uniformly with the duration of the bonds. The pattern for bonds
and bills is that correlations are highest among bonds of adjacent dura-
tions and fall off more or less uniformly as one moves to more distant
durations. In the 1965-72 subperiod the pattern of correlations is quite
similar to 1973-81 for all assets, but in the noninflationary 1953-64
subperiod the correlations among bills and bonds follow the same pat-
tern, while the real returns on stocks appear to be essentially uncorre-
lated with the real returns on bills and bonds.
In addition to the variance-covariance matrix, the next input we need
for equation (8) in order to generate numerical results is the vector of
weights for the market portfolio. Here we face some problems of both a
theoretical and an empirical sort.
At the theoretical level, one issue is whether to treat U.S. government
bonds as net wealth. There is considerable controversy among monetary
theorists on this issue, and a substantial literature on it exists.
9 We decided
to treat U.S. government debt as net wealth of the private sector.
We also ignore the default risk premium on corporate bonds by lump-
ing them together with Treasury bonds. This amounts to assuming that
they have the same variance-covariance structure.
Another problem is our exclusion of some important categories of
assets in our computation of the market portfolio. Most notable among
these are residential real estate, consumer durables, human capital, and
social security wealth.
1
0 While we do not include these in the present
paper, our plan for future extensions of this research is to seek appropri-
ate data on these other asset classes and redo our calculations to include
them.
There remains the empirical problem of determining the relative
weights of those assets which we do include in the market portfolio in the
present study. The ratio of the market value of corporate equity to the
book value of total government debt was approximately 1.5 in 1980.
Thus, 60% was the equity weight in the market portfolio. The relative
supplies of government debt by duration were approximated from a table
in the Treasury Bulletin which breaks down the quantities of government
debt by maturity: issues maturing in less than 1 year, in 1-5 years, and so
forth. We arbitrarily spread the weights evenly among the years within
each of these groupings.
This procedure obviously omits corporate debt. However, using flow-
of-funds data we computed the percentage of equity by treating both
corporate equity and the net worth of unincorporated businesses as181 Inflation and the Role of Bonds
equity. Debt then consisted of federal, corporate, and unincorporated
business credit market liabilities. This procedure also yielded a 60%
equity-to-wealth ratio. By lumping corporate debt together with U.S.
government debt we are ignoring any default risk premia.
The foregoing ignores financial intermediaries, in effect supposing that
households hold the securities of nonfinancial businesses and the govern-
ment directly. A different procedure would be to net out securities held
by intermediaries, and consider the public's holding of bank liabilities as
debt. (Deposits could be treated as Treasury bills, for example.) We plan
to experiment with this alternative in future research.
























Finally, in order to determine the equilibrium risk premia we need to
set a value for 8, the economy-wide average degree of relative risk
aversion. In a recent paper, Grossman and Shiller (1981) concluded that
a value of 4 is most consistent with the observed movements of the value
of the stock market over the past 90 years. Friend and Blume (1975) had
estimated it to be 2, while Friend and Hasbrouck (1982) found 6 to be
more appropriate. As we show below, a value of 4 produces an imputed
risk premium on stocks which is in line with direct time-series estimates of
this premium obtained by other researchers using a variety of estimation
techniques. We therefore choose 4 as our value for 8 in the calculation of
the equilibrium risk premia which we use in the remainder of the paper.
To a large extent the particular value of 8 is unimportant, since the
deviation of 8fc from 8, and not the level, is what matters most for our
results.
Table 4.3 presents the full set of imputed real risk premia (i?, - Rmin)
which we calculated using the formula embodied in equation (8), the
variance-covariance matrix of monthly real returns estimated over the
period 1973-81, and the vector of market weights and value of 8 pre-
sented above. The table also shows the individual asset variances, their
covariances with the market portfolio, and their betas on the market
portfolio. The last two columns give the values corresponding to the
minimum variance and market portfolios, respectively.
The table shows that the real risk premium on the market portfolio is
approximately 5% per year, which is almost 4 times its variance of 1.26%
per year. Since we have set 8 at 4, the risk premium on the market
portfolio would be exactly 4 times its variance if the variance of the
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risk premium on bills is only 9 basis points, and the variance is only
slightly higher than the minimum, which is not surprising since as we shall
see in the next section the minimum variance portfolio is essentially bills.
With the sole exception of duration 5, the risk premia on bonds rise
uniformly with duration reaching a maximum of 2.27% per year. Finally,
the risk premium on stocks is 7.60% per year or approximately 1.5 times
the risk premium on the market portfolio. Since the beta of stocks is
approximately 1.5, this result should not be surprising to readers familiar
with the capital asset pricing model.
1
1 It is also in line with the long-run
time-series estimates derived by Ibbotson and Sinquifield (1982) and
Merton (1980).
4.4 The Welfare Loss from Incomplete Diversification
In this section we address the question of how much welfare an investor
loses by having his choice of assets limited. The main conclusion of the
theoretical discussion in section 4.2 was that even if an investor's oppor-
tunity set is limited to only two assets, there will be no loss in welfare
provided that these two assets are the market portfolio and the minimum
variance portfolio (or any other set of two frontier portfolios). But we are
interested in the actual menu of asset choices offered in practice by many
employer-sponsored tax-sheltered savings plans in the United States.
These plans usually offer participants a choice of two or three funds: a
stock fund, an intermediate-term fixed interest bond fund, and some-
times as a third option a money market fund.
Table 4.4 presents the risk premia, variances, and asset compositions
of the optimal portfolios chosen from the full set of 10 assets for investors
with coefficients of relative risk aversion ranging from 2 to 10. Figure 4.1,
which is the familiar efficient portfolio frontier, displays graphically the
mean-variance combinations tabulated in the second and third columns
of table 4.4.
The middle row of table 4.4 corresponds to the market portfolio and
the last row to the minimum variance portfolio, which consists essentially
of bills, hedged with small offsetting short and long positions in bonds of
the various durations. Table 4.4 shows that a very risk-averse investor,
with a coefficient of risk aversion of 6, would hold 40% of his portfolio in
stocks, 40% in bills, and the remaining 20% in bonds of various dura-
tions. He would thereby attain a risk premium of about 3.3% per year
with a variance of 0.57% per year. Even an extremely risk-averse inves-
tor, one whose 8 value is 10, would still invest roughly 24% of his funds in
stocks, 67% in bills, and the remainder in bonds of various durations, in
order to attain a mean risk premium of 1.95% per year with a variance of
only 0.21% per year.











































































Efficient portfolio frontier. Source: table 4.4. Note: The num-
bers on the frontier are coefficients of relative risk aversion and
indicate the point which would be optimal for an investor
having the corresponding degree of risk aversion.
economy-wide average of 4, the investor takes larger short positions in
bills and long positions in stocks and bonds of most durations. In the first
row, for example, we see that an investor with a risk aversion coefficient
of 2 nearly doubles the mean risk premium on his portfolio relative to the
average investor but also increases the variance by a factor of 4.
Short-selling Treasury bills is difficult in practice. This difficulty can be
overcome in two ways. First, a large investment house or pension fund
could allow its less risk-averse investors to sell short to the more risk-
averse investors, as a purely internal transaction. Second, and more
likely, a less risk-averse investor can simply take a long position in stock
market futures as a way to hold a levered position in stocks.
Table 4.5 and figure 4.2 present our estimates of the welfare loss to an
investor from having his opportunity set restricted to various subsets of
the 10 asset classes. The numbers in this table represent the amount of
money the investor would need to be given per $10,000 of his current

























































































)Stocks and bonds of
duration 2 years
(2)Stocks and bonds of
duration 1 year
(3) Stocks, bills and bonds
of duration 2 years
Fig. 4.2
0 12 3 4 5 6
Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion
Welfare loss from incomplete diversification. Source: table
4.5.
be with the full set of 10 assets. In order to do these calculations we had to
determine the mean rates of return themselves, not just the risk premia.
We did this by assuming that the mean on bills is zero and calibrating all
other rates accordingly. This assumption was based on the actual mean
real return on bills observed over the past 30 years.
We also had to assume a rate of time preference and a specific planning
horizon. We arbitrarily set these at 4% per year and infinity, respectively,
but did a sensitivity analysis which we report below in table 4.6. It should
be noted that the infinite horizon assumption is really meant to represent
the case where time of death is uncertain and the parameter p in (2)
incorporates the rate of mortality as in Merton (1971). Note also that
table 4.5 shows the welfare loss from restricting the investor's portfolio
choice forever, not just for a limited period.
Table 4.5 and figure 4.2 show that when the investor is restricted to
only two assets, the welfare impact of the restriction can be quite sensitive188 Zvi Bodie/Alex Kane /Robert McDonald
Table 4.6 Effect of Rate of Time Preference and Time Horizon on the
Welfare Loss from Incomplete Diversification






















Notes: Part A assumes a coefficient of risk aversion of 4 and an infinite time horizon. The
risk premia and covariances used were the ones estimated over the 1973-81 period and
reported in table 4.2, part C, and table 4.3.
Part B assumes a rate of time preference of 4% per year. The risk premia and covariances
used were the ones estimated over the 1973-81 period and reported in table 4.2, part C, and
table 4.3.
to his coefficient of risk aversion. If the two assets are stocks and bonds of
2 years duration (curve 1), we see that the welfare loss is small for an
investor with a risk aversion coefficient equal to the average, 4, but
increases sharply on either side of this value. If, on the other hand, the
two assets are stocks and bonds of 1 year duration (curve 2), then the
welfare loss is greatest for the least risk-averse investor but is not extreme
for any investor. Investors with coefficients of risk aversion equal to 3 or 4
are better off with stocks and bonds of 2 years duration, whereas inves-
tors who are either more or less risk averse than that would prefer stocks
and bonds of 1 year duration.
A comparison of the first two columns in table 4.5 reveals that stocks
and bonds of duration one year are preferable to stocks and bills for all
investors except those with risk aversion of 2. Moving across table 4.5 we
see that as the duration of the bond fund increases the welfare loss
becomes more sensitive to the coefficient of risk aversion. Thus for bonds
of 8 years duration the smallest welfare loss relative to the full 10-asset
opportunity set occurs at a coefficient of risk aversion of 3, rising quite
sharply on either side of that value and becoming particularly severe for
very risk-averse investors.
The last column in table 4.5 shows that when the choice set is expanded
from two to three assets, stocks, bills, and bonds of 2 years duration, the
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less of their degree of risk aversion. Having these three assets to choose
from is thus almost as good as having all 10.
The effects of changing our assumptions about the rate of time prefer-
ence and the horizon are shown in table 4.6. The magnitude of the
welfare loss from restricting the choice set to stocks and bills is greater the
lower the rate of time preference and the longer the horizon.
These numerical results suggest that if an employer-sponsored savings
plan is going to restrict its participants to a choice of only two funds, then
since the sponsor does not know the exact degree of risk aversion of the
participants, it would make sense to let the two funds be stocks and bonds
of 1 or 2 years duration. If, however, the sponsor is willing to expand the
number of funds to three, then stocks, bills, and bonds of 2 years duration
will eliminate almost all of the welfare loss relative to the full 10-asset
opportunity set.
The applicability of our analysis to employer-sponsored tax-deferred
savings plans is limited by two factors: assets held outside the plan, and
taxes. Without taxes it is trivially obvious that the omission of bills from a
savings plan is of no consequence if investors can hold a money market
fund on their own account. When there are tax advantages to investing in
a savings plan, however, on the margin the investor prefers to hold assets
inside the plan. If the plan fails to offer a full menu of assets, the investor
will suffer a welfare loss. Our numerical calculations can be viewed as
applying to a world in which all assets are invested in a tax-deferred
savings plan with a restricted menu of assets. In general, however, our
numerical calculations still provide an upper bound on the possible
welfare loss, for the following reason: if the investor could in principle
invest all wealth in the plan, and chooses not to do so in order to diversify,
then the welfare loss must be less than for an investor who is (as in our
calculations) constrained to hold only those assets offered by the plan.
In practice, of course, additional complications reduce the importance
of tax-deferred savings plans. The IRS imposes a limit on the contribu-
tions to these plans, and frequently there are penalties or delays associ-
ated with the premature withdrawal of funds. These considerations will
reduce the percentage of an investor's wealth which is held in such savings
plans. Therefore the failure of the plan to offer certain assets is less
important, since freely chosen assets held outside the plan will undo the
effect of restrictions imposed within the plan. Our numerical estimates
again provide an upper bound on the welfare loss.
4.5 Shadow Riskless Rates and the Welfare Gain
from Introduction of a Riskless Real Asset
In section 4.2 we defined the shadow riskless rate of interest as that rate
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choice set expanded to include an asset which was riskless in real terms.
Equation (14) showed that this rate is below the mean real rate of return
on the minimum variance portfolio by an amount equal to the investor's
degree of relative risk aversion times the variance of the minimum
variance portfolio. Given that our estimate of this variance is a mere
.0144% per year, it follows that even a very risk averse investor (8 = 6)
would be willing to give up less than 9 basis points.
Since the average degree of risk aversion is 4, if a market for riskless
real bonds could be established costlessly, the market clearing real in-
terest rate would be about 6 basis points below the mean rate on the
minimum variance portfolio. Table 4.7 shows what the welfare gain
would be to investors with varying degrees of risk aversion.
The magnitude of the welfare gain to investors does not appear to be
large. The numbers in the first column of table 4.7 show the results
obtained using the actual covariance matrix estimated for the 1973-81
subperiod. The second column shows the results of an experiment in
which we made all nominal debt securities twice as risky by doubling their
variances and co variances, leaving the variance of stocks unchanged.
While the effect is to approximately double the welfare gain to investors
at any degree of risk aversion, the magnitude of the gain still appears
small.
These results suggest one possible reason for the nonexistence of index
bonds in the U.S. capital market. Since there would probably be some
costs associated with creating a new market for such bonds, the benefits
would have to exceed those costs. Given the assumptions of our model, in
particular the assumption of homogeneous expectations, the benefit from
trading in index bonds would have to arise from differences in the degree
of risk aversion among investors. If as table 4.7 suggests, the welfare gain
does not appear to be large over a fairly broad range of risk aversion
coefficients, then one should not be surprised at the failure of a market
for index bonds to appear.
Table 4.7 Welfare Gain from Introduction of a Real Riskless Asset (Dollars
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One should bear in mind that table 4.7 is derived assuming a zero net
aggregate supply of index bonds. Thus it does not answer the question of
whether the welfare gain from indexing government debt would be
significant.
4.6 Summary and Discussion of Findings
We undertook this research with two main policy questions in mind:
(1) Is there a significant welfare loss stemming from the practice on the
part of many employer-sponsored savings plans of restricting a partici-
pant's choice of investments to two or three asset classes? (2) What is the
potential welfare gain from the introduction of trading in privately issued
index bonds? In this section we summarize and discuss the implications of
our findings for each.
With regard to the first of these, we have shown that there is no
necessary loss of welfare from restricting an investor's choice set to only
two funds, provided these two are properly chosen. If they are the market
portfolio and the minimum variance portfolio, then there will be no loss
at all. In practice, however, many plans offer a diversified common stock
fund and an intermediate-term fixed-interest bond fund as the only two
assets, and in such cases there can be a substantial welfare loss to
participants whose degree of risk aversion differs appreciably from the
average. Most of this loss can be eliminated for risk-averse participants
by introducing as a third option a money market fund.
With regard to the second question, our results indicate that the
potential welfare gain from the introduction of index bonds in the current
U.S. capital market is probably not large. The major reason for the small
gain we calculate is the fact that one-month T-bills with their small
variance of real returns are an effective substitute for index bonds.
There are some important factors bearing on these two policy ques-
tions that we either excluded or ignored in our analysis, and we must
consider their potential effect on our conclusions. The first is the fact that
we limited ourselves to only a subset of the assets which individuals in the
United States hold in their portfolios. Specifically, we excluded residen-
tial real estate, consumer durables, and nontradeable assets like human
capital and social security wealth.
Undoubtedly the inclusion of these other assets would affect the mag-
nitude of the welfare effects we calculated. Thus the welfare loss to an
individual whose employer-sponsored savings plan offers only a stock
fund and a bond fund would almost surely be smaller. The loss would
appear smaller still were we to take into account the fact that individuals
have access to other assets outside of the plan. Nonetheless, it is probably
still true that not having a money market option lowers the welfare of
investors who are more risk averse than the average. Similarly, the small192 Zvi Bodie/Alex Kane/Robert McDonald
welfare gain from index bonds, which we calculated, would probably
become even smaller, in the context of the broader spectrum of assets,
especially when one considers that social security is indexed.
Our agenda for future research starts with a more detailed quantitative
analysis of the impact of these additional assets.
Notes
1. An example of particular relevance to academics is the plan managed by the Teachers
Insurance and Annuity Association and offered by many private educational institutions in
the United States. Under this plan the participant can choose between a common stock
fund, the College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF), and a second fund which is essentially
a portfolio of intermediate term nominal bonds.
2. See, for example, the paper by Fischer (1975) and the references cited therein.
3. All of these simplifying assumptions are, of course, counterfactual, and there is a
considerable literature on the effect of relaxing each of them. The only one we think would
materially affect the main results in this paper is the no-taxes assumption. We discuss its
likely effects in sect. 4.4.
4. A necessary condition for (4) to be correct is p > yv. See Merton (1969).
5. Pratt (1964) shows that for small changes in wealth this insurance premium is approx-
imately 1/28JC
2. Note that *
2 is the variance of the proportional change in wealth caused by
the risky prospect.
6. See Bodie (1982) for a discussion in terms of nominal rates of return and unantici-
pated inflation.
7. Note that if (p - 7v)/8 > 0 then as H ^> oo eq. (12) reduces to
(12') lfr=
8. Duration, as defined by Macaulay (1938), is a weighted average of the years to
maturity of each of the cash flows from a security. The weights are the present value of each
year's cash flow as a proportion of the total present value of the security. Duration equals
final maturity only in the case of pure discount bonds. For coupon bonds and mortgages,
duration is always less than maturity. The difference between maturity and duration for
ordinary coupon bonds and mortgages is greater the longer the final maturity and the higher
the level of interest rates. In our sample of bonds this difference rose steadily over the
1953-81 period due to the rising trend in interest rates. The most pronounced differences
were in the 8-year duration category. In 1953 the average maturity of the bonds in our 8-year
duration portfolio was just under 9 years, whereas in 1981 the average maturity of the 8-year
duration portfolio was 23 years. This variation over the last 30 years calls into question the
appropriateness of a bond return series with a constant maturity of 20 years, such as the one
tabulated by Ibbotson and Sinquefield (1982).
9. For the arguments on both sides of this debate, see Barro (1974) and Tobin (1980).
10. Including residential real estate would raise another theoretical issue. Individual
holdings of residential real estate serve both to diversify the portfolio and to hedge against
changes in the relative price of housing services. This hedging demand is ignored in our
model, and including it would substantially increase the difficulty of solving for the /
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11. Equation (9) in our model implies that
Since a^in is very small relative to the covariance of stocks with the market and to the
variance of the market, we get i?stocks ~~ ^min = Pstocks (RM ~ ^min)-
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Comment Martin J. Gruber
The paper by Bodie, Kane, and McDonald, "Inflation and the Role of
Bonds in Investor Portfolios," is both interesting and innovative. To the
best of my knowledge, it is the first attempt to employ a model of
multiperiod equilibrium to examine the welfare loss of restricting the set
of assets from which investors can choose. This is a huge undertaking,
and the paper shows a great deal of intelligent effort. Like all first papers
in an area, there are some things which could be done differently and
perhaps improved.
My major concern with this paper is the policy implications which the
authors suggest, based on their analysis. The analysis shows that investors
can gain most of the advantages of holding the 10 assets classes examined
from choosing among three asset classes: a money market fund, stocks,
and bonds of 2 years duration. If two funds are offered, they should be a
stock fund and a bond fund of 1 or 2 years duration. While these
conclusions do describe the investment process facing an investor, one
must be very careful in applying these results to the type of investment
vehicles which should be offered by private retirement savings plans. This
is the stated objective of this paper. The authors' results depend heavily
on the investors' ability to sell short as well as to buy any of the portfolios
offered. For example, in examining the optimal investment for an indi-
vidual with a relative risk aversion coefficient of 2 with $10,000 to invest,
the authors advocate the following (table 4.4, line 1):
Common stock Buy 12,060
One-month bill Sell short 9,840
All other bonds Buy 7,780
Note that the investment in common stocks is larger than the $10,000
which the investor placed in the pension fund. The authors' results
depend on the ability of the investor to short sell any type of portfolio
offered by the pension fund and to use the proceeds of this short sale to
buy other portfolios. The implications the authors draw for the type of
investment portfolios a pension fund should offer individuals is based on
Martin J. Gruber is professor of finance at New York University's Graduate School of
Business and co-managing editor of the Journal of Finance.195 Inflation and the Role of Bonds
this ability. But in choosing from among the portfolios offered by a
pension fund, one cannot short sell one or more portfolios. To draw more
meaningful conclusions about the appropriate portfolios for pension
funds to offer, the authors must reexamine their problem with short sales
restrictions.
1
Also, in drawing policy implications from this paper, the reader should
be aware that the model used assumes that the holder of the pension
funds (a) owns no other assets; (b) has no other sources of income; and
(c) finances all consumption over his lifetime from the pension fund.
While this might be a reasonable description of a subclass of retired
individuals, it certainly does not fit the average participant in a pension
fund. Care must be taken in drawing policy implications from this paper
without a more careful examination of the assets and income stream of
pension participants.
I would like briefly to raise a question about the authors' empirical
results and then to make a comment about their model. It is always
difficult to choose a time frame from which to draw parameters on a
model such as that presented by the authors.
Bodie et al. employ an equilibrium model of the form
Ri
 = ^min
 = 8(o-«n ~
 amin) •
They have chosen to use the variance of returns and correlation matrix of
returns for the period 1973-81 together with an estimate of 8 (the coef-
ficient of relative risk aversion) for the period 1889-1979. They have
rejected using the returns for the period 1973-81, but rather generate
them from the equation presented above. The authors' results are
affected by the fact that the 1973-81 period was a time of rapid and
changing inflation. This resulted in a different absolute and relative risk
of securities than in earlier periods. For example, long-term bonds have
over twice the risk (standard deviation) relative to stocks in this period
that they had in earlier periods. One might reasonably ask if this change
in absolute and relative risk was accompanied by a change in 8. While
Bodie et al. accepted the Grossman and Shiller estimate of 8 found as 4
over the period 1889-1979, they ignored the comments made by Gross-
man and Shiller in the same article that the estimates of 8 for recent
subperiods were much higher.
I would like to discuss briefly an alternate way of viewing the equilib-
rium model employed in this paper. Solving the authors' equation (10)






While this form of the model is correct, there is an alternative way of
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Since this model must hold for all assets and portfolios, it holds for an
asset which has a zero beta with the market portfolio, or
D D
r> D _ m ^min / _ 2 \
"•z -^min 2 2 ^ min/ •
® m O"min
Solving for Rmin, substituting into equation (1) above, and simplifying,
we find
(2) Ri = Rz + ^i(Rm-Rz).
The two-factor (Black) CAPM model holds in real terms with the
continuous formulation of variables.
In fact, we could have derived this quite simply without resorting to
Merton's work. Under a log or power utility function and i.i.d. returns,
we know that myopic decisions are optimal.
2 Since investors are maximiz-
ing a utility function in terms of means and variances of real returns,
equation (2) follows directly from Roll's work.
3
In summary, I believe the authors have made an interesting start at
examining an important and complex problem. They indicate at several
points in their paper that this is the first step in a continuing research
project. I look forward to following their continuing research.
Notes
1. In the revised version of their paper, the authors advocate the use of futures as the
more likely way to alleviate the short sales restriction for the less risk-averse investor. One
should be aware that the incorporation of futures into the analysis could significantly modify
the authors' conclusions. The expected return, variance, and covariance with other assets of
a portfolio of futures is significantly different from a leveraged portfolio of stocks because
the purchase of futures involves no cash outflow; dividends are not received by the holder of
stock futures; and marking to the market involves intermediate cash flows.
2. See Edwin J. Elton and Martin J. Gruber, "The Multiperiod Consumption Invest-
ment Problem and Single Period Analysis," Oxford Economic Papers 26 (July, 1974) :289-
301.
3. See Richard Roll, "A Critique of the Asset Pricing Theory's Tests; Part 1: On Past
and Potential Testability of the Theory," Journal of Financial Economics 4 (March,
1977):129-76.